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Adam Schenk*

Insulated from Justice? Religious Expulsion
Before Canadian Courts in the post-Highwood
Era

Judicial consideration of religious disputes prompt concerns that the legal system
may delve into issues of a spiritual nature that should enjoy some insulation
from legal comment or intervention. These concerns are only heightened in
instances where the dispute concerns the very serious issue of the expulsion
of a member from their religious community. While necessary care is warranted
in these sensitive circumstances, a blanket prohibition on legal intervention in
instances of religious expulsion creates the possibility that a member of a religious
community may experience the devastation of expulsion in an unfair and unjust
manner. This paper, written prior to the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral v Aga but
anticipating its outcome, argues that Canadian law lacks a proper framework to
facilitate appropriate legal consideration of these sensitive disputes where such
consideration is necessary.

L’examen judiciaire des litiges religieux suscite des inquiétudes quant à la possibilité
que le système juridique s’immisce dans des questions de nature spirituelle qui
devraient être protégées de tout commentaire ou intervention juridique. Ces
inquiétudes sont encore plus vives dans les cas où le litige porte sur la question
très grave de l’expulsion d’un membre de sa communauté religieuse. Bien qu’une
attention nécessaire soit justifiée dans ces circonstances délicates, interdire de
manière générale l’intervention juridique dans les cas d’expulsion religieuse crée
la possibilité qu’un membre d’une communauté religieuse fasse la douloureuse
expérience de l’expulsion d’une manière injuste et inéquitable. Dans le présent
article, rédigé avant la décision de la Cour suprême du Canada dans l’affaire
Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral c. Aga, mais
anticipant son résultat, nous soutenons que le droit canadien ne dispose pas
d’un cadre adéquat pour faciliter l’examen juridique approprié de ces différends
sensibles lorsqu’un tel examen est nécessaire.

*
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and Neil McCartney for providing their legal perspectives. A very special thank you to my mom and
personal editor-in-chief, Yvonne Schenk, who has read and commented on nearly everything I have
ever written and has provided endless guidance and support in all things academic (and otherwise!).
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Introduction
Given Canada’s cultural and religious diversity it is unsurprising that
some Canadians choose to resolve disputes in accordance with religious
principles rather than via secular forums of dispute resolution or
adjudication. A variety of religious communities utilize quasi-judicial,
internal processes to resolve community disputes, such as whether to
expel a member from the community, in accordance with religious dogma.
A party to one of these disputes, unhappy with the ultimate decision of the
community’s adjudicators, will occasionally initiate a legal claim hoping
to receive a different result from a Canadian court. The ensuing cases are
often challenging. Judges that are tasked with determining whether legal
intervention in the internal decision of a religious community is appropriate
must consider difficult questions regarding the limits of judicial oversight
in a society where church and state have been clearly separated.
While Canadian courts are loath to interfere in internal religious
affairs and will generally avoid intervention in religious disputes where
possible, some cases will require the piercing of this veil to address severe
injustices.1 While the framework of administrative law provided practical
tools for courts addressing these cases, the application of the principles of
judicial review were deemed inappropriate in the legal consideration of
the decisions of religious adjudicators in the Supreme Court of Canada’s
2018 decision in Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial

1.
Justice Muldoon concisely explains this unique context in Reed v R, [1989] 3 FC 259, 1989
CarswellNat 291 (WL Can) (Ont Div Crt), noting at para 8 that while “in any collision between
religious practice and secular law, the secular state will jealously enforce its criminal law and other
public law despite religious claims or objections…[however] so long as those [religious] passions
do not cause, create or commit criminal offences or civil delicts, which are entirely within the state’s
power of legislation, the secular state will not, and ought not to intervene in religious affairs.”
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Committee) v Wall.2 While the decision in Highwood was undoubtedly
legally correct on this point, subsequent case law in this area, most
notably the Ontario Court of Appeal’s 2020 decision in Aga v Ethiopian
Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada,3 suggests that Canadian law
still lacks an appropriate framework for the legal consideration of the
decisions of religious adjudicators. As will be demonstrated, addressing
these disputes through the lens of ordinary contract law is unhelpful and
largely undesirable from the perspectives of the courts as well as religious
communities and individual claimants. The current status of the law
creates the potential for mistreatment of individual members of religious
communities in the form of unfair expulsion without the possibility of any
legal remedy. The ultimate solution to this issue may be specific guidance
in this area from legislatures to better guide and equip judges tasked with
hearing these difficult cases.
I. The status of the law pre-Highwood
The judicial approach to considering decisions of internal adjudicators
of religious communities was heavily reliant on the framework of
administrative law, in particular its principles ensuring procedural fairness
is afforded to the affected individual,4 prior to the decision in Highwood.
This provided a practical, fair and familiar way for courts to address internal
adjudicative decisions of religious groups. Simply grabbing your judicial
review glasses off the shelf to assess the case and determining whether
intervention was necessary, in the same manner as you would consider
the decision of an administrative tribunal, was an elegantly simple option
for Canadian judges. Applying the principles of procedural fairness meant
that religious members would be afforded the necessary rights to respond

2.
2018 SCC 26 [Highwood].
3.
2020 ONCA 10 [Aga]. This article was completed in its entirety prior to the Supreme Court’s
eventual decision in this case, Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St. Mary Cathedral
v Aga, 2021 SCC 22.
4.
A complete review of the concept of procedural fairness is far outside the scope of this paper,
but the principles underlying procedural fairness as noted in para 22 in Baker v Canada (Minister of
Citizenship and Immigration), [1999] SCR 817, 1999 CanLII 699 (SCC) capture its basic essence:
Although the duty of fairness is flexible and variable, and depends on an appreciation
of the context of the particular statute and the rights affected, it is helpful to review the
criteria that should be used in determining what procedural rights the duty of fairness
requires in a given set of circumstances. I emphasize that underlying all these factors
[considered in determining the appropriate procedural rights] is the notion that the purpose
of the participatory rights contained within the duty of procedural fairness is to ensure
that administrative decisions are made using a fair and open procedure, appropriate to the
decision being made and its statutory, institutional, and social context, with an opportunity
for those affected by the decision to put forward their views and evidence fully and have
them considered by the decision-maker.
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to whatever allegations had been made against them by their community,
thereby ensuring some basic element of justice in these internal processes.
In her summation of some of the early case law surrounding the discipline
of church laypeople generally and religious expulsion particularly,
Professor MH Ogilvie identifies some of the valuable principles that
ensured fairness for individuals subjected to religious tribunals:
The principles of natural justice are required to be followed in all matters
of lay discipline, whether or not the constitution or customary practices
of the religious institution so provide; thus, lay members under discipline
must be told the full case against them, receive the right to reply, and be
heard by an unbiased tribunal.
When a decision is made to expel a member, it must be carried out
in accordance with the proper procedures of that institution and the
civil court will intervene to order that such procedures be followed.
Membership rights in a religious institution can be removed only for
cause, and where they have been improperly withdrawn, a civil court
will intervene in the internal life of the institution to restore them or to
order a proper hearing of the issues.5

In order to find that the very practical framework of administrative
law and its principles of procedural fairness were legally applicable to
religious disputes, however, it was necessary to explain how the courts
had jurisdiction to apply these administrative law principles in this
unique context. Administrative law is a branch of public law, whereas
religious expulsion is a very private matter,6 and this lack of congruity
meant that some very stretched legal reasoning was necessary to bring
religious disputes under the umbrella of administrative law. Two of the
methods utilized to come under this umbrella are demonstrated in the
decision in Lindenburger v United Church of Canada.7 Lindenburger dealt
with the circumstances surrounding the breakdown of the relationship
between Reverend Lindenburger and the United Church congregation
which he pastored.8 The motion of the United Church to have Reverend
5.
M H Ogilvie, Religious Institutions and the Law in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017)
at 328 [citations omitted].
6.
The limited application of administrative law was succinctly described in Karahalios v
Conservative Party of Canada, 2020 ONSC 3145 at para 177 [Karahalios]; Justice Perell notes that
“judicial review, however, is for the review of the exercise of public power and, therefore, judicial
review is not available outside of the public sector sphere” [citations omitted].
7.
[1985] OJ No 1195 (QL), 10 OAC 191, (Ont Div Crt) [Lindenburger]. This decision was upheld
by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Lindenburger v United Church of Canada, 1987 CarswellOnt 899
(WL Can), 20 OAC 381.
8.
Lindenburger, supra note 7 at para 17. The dismissal of employees of religious communities,
particularly from positions that are spiritual in nature, lies outside the scope of this paper but has also
presented unique questions and challenges with which Canadian courts have grappled.

Insulated from Justice? Religious Expulsion Before
Canadian Courts in the Post-Highwood Era

5

Lindenburger’s request for judicial review quashed on the grounds that
the courts lacked jurisdiction was dismissed by the Divisional Court.9
Justice Rosenberg explained multiple routes via which jurisdiction could
be found and the principles of administrative law therefore applicable:
The right to intervene in church affairs should be rarely exercised by
the Court. However, since the church is a creature of statute of both the
federal and provincial Legislatures and it is common knowledge that
it ministers to the spiritual needs of a large segment of the Canadian
public, it has a sufficient public character that it should be amenable
to the process of certiorari. At a minimum it has a duty of procedural
fairness in dealing with its members. Accordingly, there might be some
circumstances where the Court would intervene. For these reasons, the
motion to quash fails.10

While the statutory nature of the United Church of Canada is unique, and
would not provide an avenue for a finding of jurisdictional authority for
many religious communities, the argument that religious communities are
sufficiently public in character and therefore attract a duty of procedural
fairness pursuant to the principles of administrative law has far broader
possible application. The court in Lindenburger does not go into particular
detail regarding the test to be met regarding public character, with Justice
Rosenberg in the above passage suggesting that the test is simply serving a
“large segment” of the Canadian public. This test is as minimal in its detail
as it is broad in its potential application and Lindenburger is unsurprisingly
relied upon in a number of subsequent decisions as authority for the
application of the principles of judicial review in the scrutinizing of church
decisions.11
II. The impact of Highwood
The major issue with the pre-Highwood framework was that a very practical
house had been built on a very weak legal foundation. There was obvious
utility in adopting the principles of administrative law in considering
the decisions of religious adjudicators, but the legal justification for
adopting these principles in this context was questionable at best. While
the application of the principles of procedural fairness in private disputes
may be desirable, and perhaps ultimately just, it is typically the place of
the parties involved in a private disagreement to determine that certain
9.
Justice Barr dissented in the ultimate decision in the case but did not disagree with the majority
of the Divisional Court on the issue of jurisdiction to impose the principles of procedural fairness (see
ibid at para 80).
10. Lindenburger, supra note 7 at para 19.
11. See for instance Davis v United Church of Canada (1991), 8 OR (3d) 75 at paras 46-49, 92 DLR
(4th) 678; Mott-Trille v Steed (1996), 27 OR (3d) 486 at para 12, [1996] OJ No 202 (QL).
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principles should govern their dispute unless the legislature has decided to
impose these principles explicitly upon them via statute. While Canadian
law does provide for some bleeding of legal principles from public law
into private law, such as the permissible influence of the values of the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms12 in the interpretation and
application of private causes of action and their remedies,13 it does not
simply follow that courts should impose principles of public law in the
realm of private law without justification.
It is on the problematic application of the principles of administrative
law in a private context that the decision in Highwood truly turns. Mr. Wall
was expelled from the Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses by
the Congregation’s Judicial Committee after it determined that expulsion
was warranted in light of Wall’s admittance of sinful behaviour and
insufficient repentance of his wrongdoing. After exhausting the appeal
opportunities available to him within the larger Jehovah’s Witnesses
community, Wall applied for judicial review of the Judicial Committee’s
decision.14 Both the Alberta Court of Queen’s Bench and the Alberta Court
of Appeal15 found that the courts had jurisdiction to hear the application
for judicial review. The Court of Appeal’s holding was very much in line
with the reasoning developed in Lindenburger and other decisions within
this line of cases. The Supreme Court summarized the majority ruling of
the Court of Appeal as follows:
The majority held that the courts may intervene in decisions of voluntary
organizations concerning membership where property or civil rights are
at issue. The majority also held that even where no property or civil
rights are engaged, courts may intervene in the decision of voluntary
associations where there is a breach of the rules of natural justice or where
the complainant has exhausted internal dispute resolution processes.16

The Supreme Court disagreed with the Alberta Court of Appeal and took
the opportunity to clearly state that judicial review is not available for
decisions of private religious communities. Speaking for a unanimous
court, Justice Rowe clarified that there is no freestanding right to procedural
12. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule
B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 [Charter].
13. The influence of Charter values on private causes of action based in the common law was
confirmed and explained by the Supreme Court in Hill v Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 SCR 1130 at
paras 94-101, 1995 CanLII 59 (SCC).
14. Highwood, supra note 2 at para 1.
15. Wall v Highwood Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses (Judicial Committee), 2016 ABCA 255
at para 29.
16. Highwood, supra note 2 at para 9. See ibid at para 19 for a discussion of cases involving preHighwood judicial review for voluntary associations such as political parties, sports clubs and schools.
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fairness in the decisions of private religious communities to expel a
particular member and that “simply because a decision impacts a broad
segment of the public does not mean that it is public in the administrative
law sense of the term.”17 This firmly closed the door on the extremely broad
public character test utilized in Lindenburger. Justice Rowe’s reasoning
was undoubtedly correct and clarified the nature of judicial review and the
very particular contexts in which its principles apply. Administrative law
resides firmly in the realm of public, not private, law.
While the Supreme Court rejected Wall’s request for a remedy pursuant
to judicial review, this did not close off the possibility of a remedy based
on a private law cause of action. Courts will be appropriately wary of
legal actions grounded in religious disputes but this does not mean that
any dispute that is religious in nature will go unheard. In order for courts
to consider these disputes, the claimants, like any other party initiating
a private law claim, must be able to identify a legal right that has been
violated by the religious community. If a claimant is unable to identify a
discernible legal right, noted Justice Rowe, then the courts have no authority
to comment on the procedures of a religious community in expelling one
of its members.18 This is no more and no less than the rights afforded to
every other Canadian; outside of the extraordinary recognition of a new
type of private claim, a lack of a recognized cause of action means that the
courts are unable to grant any type of remedy to an aggrieved party.
While the Court’s reasoning concerning the necessity of a discernible
legal right is as accurate as the Court’s reasoning regarding the
inapplicability of judicial review, the facts at issue in Highwood present
a context in which individual members of a religious community may
be subject to significant injustices to which the Canadian justice system
cannot, at least as the law exists presently, provide a remedy. Wall had
been a member of the Highwood Congregation for thirty-four years before
being disfellowshipped,19 a very significant commitment unlikely to be
maintained by someone who does not place substantial personal value on
their relationship with their faith community. Indeed, the circumstances
that Wall had endured while still endeavouring to maintain his membership
in his religious community, including a requirement prior to his own
expulsion to shun his teenage daughter after she had been previously
expelled from the Congregation, were accurately suggested by Patrick
Hart in his analysis of the Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision in Highwood
17.
18.
19.

Ibid at para 21.
Ibid at para 24.
Ibid at para 6.
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as possibly “strik[ing] some as heart-wrenching.”20 It is unlikely that Wall
would have even attempted to endure such difficulties unless the personal
importance of his affiliation with his religious community was deep and
significant.
While Wall’s relationship with his community appeared to be
significant in depth, the legal organization of the Highwood Congregation
was tremendously shallow:
The Congregation is a voluntary association. It is not incorporated and
has no articles of association or by-laws. It has no statutory foundation.
It does not own property. No member of the Congregation receives any
salary or pecuniary benefit from membership. Congregational activities
and spiritual guidance are provided on a volunteer basis by a group of
elders.21

Not dissimilar to many other religious communities across Canada, the
Highwood Congregation had not chosen to incorporate, meaning that
possible legal remedies available to members of not-for-profit corporations
were not available to Wall. The net result of the informal nature of the
Highwood Congregation, coupled with the Supreme Court’s elimination
of resort to the principles of administrative law, was that Wall was left
without any legal right on which he could rely. The Court was therefore
unable to provide any type of remedy concerning Wall’s expulsion,
regardless of whether or not they thought a remedy would be just.22
III. The misfit between religion and the law of contract
The Supreme Court’s decision in Highwood seemingly leaves members of
a religious community that are unhappy with a decision of the community’s
internal adjudicators with a single option, namely an argument that the
decision breached the contract that existed between the individual and
the community. For a number of reasons, however, the relationship
between individual adherents and their religious communities will often
be the proverbial square peg that does not neatly fit into the round hole of
Canadian contract law.
There are a number of very basic, well-established principles of
contract law that will have application to any legal claim made on the basis
of breach of contract. Some of these principles speak to the interpretation
20. Patrick Hart, “Justice for (W)all: Judicial Review and Religion” (2017) 43:1 Queen’s LJ 1 at 6
[citations omitted].
21. Highwood, supra note 2 at para 3.
22. While not perfectly synonymous circumstances, one cannot help but recall the vexation resulting
from the common law’s inability to provide just outcomes prior to the development of the law of
equity.
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of contracts, while others govern the prerequisites that must exist in order
for a contract to have been created in the first place. As any first-year
Canadian law student will readily explain, contracts require the basic
foundation of offer, acceptance, and consideration. There is also the
separate, but related, requirement that the parties must intend to create
a legal relationship.23 In many contractual disputes, particularly those
involving formal, written contracts between sophisticated parties, these
basic elements are clearly met and do not require significant consideration
(no pun intended) by the parties or their lawyers. In less formal contexts,
however, these requirements may not have been so obviously met, thus
creating a significant obstacle for a plaintiff. While there is a wide range of
formalism in Canadian religious communities, it is not unusual for some
communities, such as the Highwood Congregation, to utilize very legally
informal structures and relationships with its members.24 As suggested by
the Court in Highwood, this will create an uphill battle for members of
religious communities to make what at present appears to be the only legal
argument available to them, namely that their expulsion was improper
insofar as it breached the contract that existed between the parties. If a
member cannot establish the basic elements demanded by Canadian law,
then there is no contract capable of being breached.
The Court in Highwood considered (somewhat in the abstract) whether
a contractual relationship existed between Wall and the Congregation. In
their analysis, the Court noted the difficulties in establishing the intent
to form a contractual relationship and suggested that courts would be
reluctant to find that a contract has been formed in this particular context:
Mr. Wall argues that a contractual right (or something resembling a
contractual right) exists between himself and the Congregation. There
was no such finding by the chambers judge. No basis has been shown
that Mr. Wall and the Congregation intended to create legal relations.
Unlike many other organizations, such as professional associations, the
Congregation does not have a written constitution, by-laws or rules that
would entitle members to have those agreements enforced in accordance
with their terms. In Zebroski v. Jehovah’s Witnesses (1988), 87 A.R. 229
(Alta. C.A.), at paras. 22-25, the Court of Appeal of Alberta ruled that
membership in a similarly constituted congregation did not grant any

23. John D McCamus, The Law of Contracts, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2012) at 112-113.
Certainty of terms, or consensus ad idem, is also, of course, a fundamental element for the formation
of a contract.
24. Even in religious communities that have incorporated it does not necessarily follow that this will
result in the legal formalizing of the relationships between members and their religious community.
For instance, in Aga, supra note 3 at para 10 the plaintiffs were not members of the Cathedral’s
corporation despite the Cathedral’s process for membership in the community.
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contractual right in and of itself. The appeal can therefore be distinguished
from Hofer v. Hofer, [1970] S.C.R. 958 (S.C.C.), at pp. 961 and 963,
Senez c. Montreal Real Estate Board, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 555 (S.C.C.), at
pp. 566 and 568, and Lakeside Colony, at p. 174. In all of these cases,
the Court concluded that the terms of these voluntary associations were
contractually binding.
Moreover, mere membership in a religious organization, where no civil
or property right is formally granted by virtue of membership, should
remain outside the scope of the Lakeside Colony criteria. Otherwise,
it would be devoid of its meaning and purpose. In fact, members of
a congregation may not think of themselves as entering into a legally
enforceable contract by merely adhering to a religious organization,
since “[a] religious contract is based on norms that are often faith-based
and deeply held”: R. Moon, “Bruker v. Marcovitz: Divorce and the
Marriage of Law and Religion” (2008), 42 S.C.L.R. (2d) 37, at p. 45.
Where one party alleges that a contract exists, they would have to show
that there was an intention to form contractual relations. While this may
be more difficult to show in the religious context, the general principles
of contract law would apply.25

It is very easy to envision circumstances in which an aggrieved member of a
religious community may have significant difficulties proving the existence
of a contract between themselves and their community. If a hypothetical
church attendee never formalizes their membership within the community,
either in writing, via religious ceremony or ritual, or otherwise, it will be
difficult to demonstrate that any type of offer to form a contract was made
and accepted. In a similar vein, not all religious communities demand a
formal financial commitment from members, preferring instead to provide
an opportunity for non-obligatory contributions. If this same hypothetical
church attendee is not able to give financially to the church as a result of a
fixed income and is unable to contribute to the community in other forms,
such as helping with the upkeep of the church property or assisting in service
preparations, there is seemingly a lack of consideration as the religious
community is not receiving anything from this attendee that is likely to
be recognized as consideration by a Canadian court.26 Yet this attendee
25. Highwood, supra note 2 at para 29.
26. It is not suggested here that the membership and presence of physically, mentally, financially
or otherwise limited persons is not meaningful for religious communities or that these individuals
cannot provide anything to other members, only that their limitations may prevent them from
making contributions that could be legally recognized as consideration. The legal hurdle to establish
consideration in Canadian contract law is quite low, as even the provision of something of trivial value
such as a peppercorn may suffice (see McCamus, The Law of Contracts, supra note 23 at 226). Despite
this low hurdle, it is nevertheless difficult to envision a secular court ascribing even trivial value in the
context of contract law to something as ethereal as, for instance, participation in collective religious
worship or prayer.
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may place significant personal value on their relationship with the church,
however that relationship may be described, and would be devastated to
be expelled from the community for some alleged indiscretion without
any element of procedural fairness. In these hypothetical circumstances,
however, there appears to be no recourse to the courts, as there is clearly
no freestanding right to procedural fairness post-Highwood and there is no
reasonable argument of breach of contract.
Even if this hypothetical church attendee were able to demonstrate
offer, acceptance and consideration, there is still the significant obstacle
of proving that there was an intention between the parties to enter into
a contractual relationship. Of all the stumbling blocks, this is likely the
most significant for two major reasons. First, the finding of an intention
to create legal relations in the context of a religious community and
its member is unlikely given the courts’ reluctance to find that a legal
relationship has been established in social circumstances,27 a position that
is reflected by the Supreme Court’s analysis in Highwood. It is especially
unlikely the closer the context is to “mere” religious membership as
opposed to circumstances of communal religious living where financial
and commercial considerations are intertwined with spiritual affiliation.28
Second, the courts are concerned with the very real implications of finding
that a contract exists in the context of religious membership, namely the
unenviable task of properly interpreting the contract, considering which
terms of the contract are properly enforceable and which are not, and
choosing the appropriate remedies if the contract’s terms are breached.
These tasks would present significant and awkward challenges that would
pull judges far deeper into the internal workings of a religious community
than they would wish, making a finding that the parties had the intent to
create a legal relationship in this context all the more unlikely.
Canadian courts are now seemingly unable to address some significant
injustices that may take place within religious communities as a result of
the removal of the application of principles of judicial review to religious
disputes and the inherent challenges in making a claim based on contract
in the context of religious expulsions (and the challenges identified here

27. McCamus, The Law of Contracts, supra note 23 at 136.
28. Hutterite colonies in particular present challenging circumstances for the courts where spiritual
affiliation and commercial activities may be intertwined and expulsion carries both spiritual and
financial ramifications for expelled members. See for example Lakeside Colony of Hutterian Brethren
v Hofer, [1992] 3 SCR 165, 1992 CanLII 37 (SCC). The intersection of business and religious
engagement was also address in Highwood, supra note 2 at para 30, with the Court holding that
Wall did not have any legal right to be allowed to carry on business with members of the religious
community from which he had been expelled.
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are not being suggested as an exhaustive list). There should be concern
whenever significant injustices occur that the legal system is entirely unable
to address. While it is important for courts to not unnecessarily delve into
the internal disputes of religious communities, it does not follow that all
internal decisions, particularly decisions as serious as expulsion, should be
free from any type of legal scrutiny. In several cases where interference in
religious decision-making was considered by the courts, reference to the
principles of procedural fairness was often accompanied by a reference
to natural justice.29 These references to natural justice suggest that refusal
to scrutinize the decision of a religious community simply by virtue of
its religious nature runs contrary to a basic right to justice held by each
member of a society. One wonders whether the unfortunate result of the
Highwood decision is that religious adherents have been distanced from
access to justice within their own communities.
IV. The potential impact of Aga
While a claim based on breach of contract is a problematic option for
those who feel they have been improperly expelled from their religious
community, this single route may be even further limited depending on
the ultimate outcome in Aga v Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of
Canada.30
The facts in Aga are unique even within the uncommon category of
cases dealing with religious expulsion. The plaintiffs are five members of
the congregation of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada
(also known as St. Mary’s Cathedral), all of whom had been a part of the
congregation for more than twenty years. The plaintiffs all sat on a committee
tasked with investigating an alleged heretical movement within the church
community.31 The committee presented several recommendations to the
administration of the diocese based on their findings.32 The archbishop
chose not to implement the committee’s recommendations, much to the
displeasure of the plaintiffs, who publicly voiced their objections.33 After
warnings to stop their public attacks on the archbishop’s decision, the
plaintiffs were informed, via both a personal letter from the archbishop
and a letter from the Cathedral’s legal counsel, that they had been expelled
from the Cathedral.34
29. This is noted in Hart v Roman Catholic Episcopal Corp of the Diocese of Kingston, 2011 ONCA
728 at para 19.
30. Aga, supra note 3.
31. Ibid at para 22.
32. Ibid at para 24.
33. Ibid at paras 25-27.
34. Ibid at paras 27-29. Given the Cathedral’s position that there was no unique legal relationship
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The plaintiffs initiated legal action against the Cathedral. They alleged
that the procedures regarding expulsion laid out in the constitution and bylaws of the greater Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church in the Diaspora
(referred to hereafter as “the Church”) had not been followed.35 The
Cathedral moved for summary judgment, successfully arguing that there
was no contractual relationship between itself and the plaintiffs, resulting
in a dismissal of the claim.36 The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed this
decision unanimously. During the writing of this article, leave to appeal
the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in Aga was granted by the
Supreme Court and the case was heard on 9 December 2020.37
The evidence presented on the motion for summary judgment
seemingly satisfied a number of the criteria for the creation of a contract.
The Court of Appeal appeared to identify that offer, acceptance, and
consideration had been demonstrated:
In this case, the appellants were not simply adherents of the faith. They
applied to be members of the Congregation and offered consideration in
the form of monthly payments. They completed the required membership
forms.38
Upon approval of their applications, the appellants became members of
the Congregation. They entered into a mutual agreement to be part of the
Congregation and abide by the governing rules, whether or not they were
specifically aware of the terms.39

Short of becoming a member of a religious community’s not-for-profit
corporation where one exists, this is likely as formal a membership
process as one could expect to find for the admittance of new members
to a religious community. If the Supreme Court ultimately reinstates the
decision of the motions judge on this point, it is difficult to envision a
factual scenario that would establish a contractual relationship regarding
the membership of an individual within their religious community.
While satisfying the criteria of offer, acceptance and consideration is
helpful for the plaintiffs, this does not displace the burden of establishing
between itself and its expelled members, it is interesting that the need was felt to send each of the
members a letter from a lawyer.
35. Ibid at para 3.
36. Ibid at paras 5-6.
37. Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church of Canada St Mary Cathedral, et al v Teshome Aga, et
al, 2020 CanLII 40630 (SCC), 2020 CarswellOnt 8480 (WL Can). Reference to the Supreme Court’s
judgment (again, rendered after the completion of this article) is at note 4.
38. The lack of evidence regarding the proper completion of the forms and the contributions made
by the plaintiffs was at issue before the Supreme Court. The analysis in this paper works from the
assumption that they were properly completed.
39. Aga, supra note 3 at paras 46-47.
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that the parties intended to create a contractual relationship. The Ontario
Court of Appeal did not consider this issue with any depth or specificity,
instead relying on the existence of the Church’s by-laws and constitution
as creating a contract between the parties:
Voluntary associations do not always have written constitutions and bylaws. But when they do exist, they constitute a contract setting out the
rights and obligations of members and the organization. In Ahenakew v.
MacKay (2004), 71 O.R. (3d) 130 (Ont. C.A.), at paras. 20 and 26, this
court affirmed that voluntary associations are “a complex of contracts
between each and every other member. The terms of these contracts are to
be found in the constitution and by-laws of the voluntary association.”40

This analysis puts the cart before the horse. The existence of possible
terms of a potential contract does not simply establish that the parties
intended to form a contract, and on this point alone the Supreme Court
could well substitute the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal with that
of the motions judge that there was no contractual relationship between
the parties.41 This would, of course, leave the plaintiffs without a cause of
action and therefore without a remedy.
While the finding that a contract was formed between the parties would
entitle the plaintiffs to some type of just remedy, likely in the form of an
order directing the Cathedral to follow the expulsion process contemplated
in the Church’s by-laws and constitution, the ultimate impact of this ruling
as a precedent would be very problematic. It could invite extensive future
breach of contract claims initiated by aggrieved adherents against their
religious communities in a variety of contexts, forcing the courts into
contractual analyses in awkward and challenging circumstances as well as
inserting judges far more deeply into religious disputes than is desirable.
Canadian courts, as clarified in the Supreme Court’s decision in Bruker v
40. Ibid at para 40. This is sometimes referred to as the web of contracts theory.
41. The web of contracts theory has also been relied upon in recent non-religious cases, notably
in disputes between the Conservative Party of Canada and individuals pursuing candidacy for their
various leadership positions: see Karahalios, supra note 6 at paras 180-181 and Melek v Conservative
Party of Canada, 2021 ONSC 1959 at paras 13-15. While a rejection of the web of contracts theory
by the Supreme Court in their eventual decision in Aga would have ramifications for its use in nonreligious disputes as well, parties to these disputes may still be able to avail themselves of a contractual
argument, with a proper contractual analysis centred on the intention of the parties and the particular
context and circumstances in which the parties have engaged with each other. A court may find, for
instance, that it was the intention of a political party and its prospective leadership applicant to create
a contractual relationship, with the party’s written constitution and by-laws forming terms of that
contract, and a contractual argument is therefore available without reliance on the web of contracts
theory. Simply from a practical standpoint, one can see that a contract-based argument is far more
appropriate in this more professional context as compared to a dispute between a religious adherent
and their faith community.
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Marcovitz, have the capacity to interpret and enforce contracts based on
religious principles, but will be careful to only do so in the appropriate
contexts and circumstances. 42 The contractual disputes that a finding of a
contract in Aga would invite as a precedent are far from desirable both for
the courts and religious communities.
None of the conceivable outcomes in Aga are likely to find a balance
that ultimately meets the needs of religious communities or their individual
adherents. The ultimate solution therefore may well lie outside of the
hands of the courts.
V. A route forward
A solution may be more readily provided by legislatures than by the
courts. Ontario, for instance, has long resisted the formal acknowledgment
of religious adjudication of any type, most notably in the decision not
to acknowledge or address religious arbitration in Ontario’s Arbitration
Act43 by the government of Dalton McGuinty in response to the desire
within some segments of the Muslim community to establish arbitration
centres based on sharia law.44 The net result of three factors—the lack
of legislative input on religious dispute resolution, the Supreme Court’s
decision in Highwood that removed the application of judicial review
principles and the lack of congruity between religious disputes and the law
of contract—is a legal vacuum. Within this vacuum, religious members
can be unfairly punished to the point of expulsion from the religious
community by internal adjudicators without legal recourse. While an
appropriate level of insulation between the legal and religious realms in
Canada is certainly necessary, the tremendous personal toll that expulsion
from a religious community can have on a community member suggests
that where such expulsion has been determined in an inappropriate fashion,
judicial intervention is merited. The constitutional protection of freedom
of religion in the Charter should not mean that religious communities
can decide on issues of expulsion without the guarantee of any process
offering something resembling procedural fairness and be almost entirely
insulated from any type of potential legal scrutiny.

42. 2007 SCC 54. Speaking for the majority, Justice Abella highlights at para 47 that the context in
question in that case was a formal separation agreement developed with the assistance of legal counsel,
bringing the religious obligation in that agreement “appropriately under a judicial microscope.”
43. Arbitration Act, 1991, SO 1991, c 17.
44. Richard Moon, Freedom of Conscience and Religion (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2014) at 159-160.
Professor Moon notes that the failure to regulate religious arbitration has in all likelihood driven these
processes to be even more secretive, making abuses that may be occurring that much harder to detect
and address.
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The imposition of some basic principles of procedural fairness in the
internal determination of religious disputes would undoubtedly attract
a legal challenge on the basis that this imposition violates the religious
freedoms protected under section 2(a) of the Charter,45 but there is
certainly a reasonable argument to be made that such a breach would be
justified under section 146 pursuant to the test from R v Oakes.47 Limited
impositions of basic elements of procedural fairness would help further the
important objective of protecting religious adherents from mistreatment
while minimally infringing on the ability of religious communities to
handle their own affairs. These procedural protections for individual
adherents would support the protection of religious freedoms as an
inherently personal right, a perspective that has been stressed in previous
jurisprudence regarding section 2(a).48 While this potential imposition in the
internal affairs of religious organizations would no doubt be opposed by a
number of religious communities determined to safeguard their autonomy,
limited legislation providing very basic procedural safeguards is far less
of an imposition than the application of the ordinary law of contract if
a contract were found to exist between members and their communities.
Some religious communities may in fact discover that these legislative
safeguards, rather than undermining the community’s autonomy, are in
fact harmonious with existing procedures and religious perspectives on
morality and fairness.
Hypothetical legislation would have to be necessarily limited to the
imposition of a right to procedural fairness only, not a right of substantive
review of the expulsion decision itself, which would pull the judiciary too
significantly into the religious realm.49 This would provide a reasonable
compromise and stimulate transparency in the expulsion process while
still honouring the rights of religious communities to make decisions
based on their interpretation and application of their own religious dogma.
This is not a perfect solution, as it would still allow for inappropriate
45. Charter, supra note 12, s 2(a): “2. Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (a)
freedom of conscience and religion.”
46. Ibid, s 1: “1. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law that can be demonstrably justified
in a free and democratic society.”
47. R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 1986 CanLII 46 (SCC).
48. Most notably Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, 2004 SCC 47 at paras 42-43.
49. The need to limit the intervention of the courts in regards to substantive religious issues is well
demonstrated in the decision in Syndicat Northcrest v Amselem, ibid. While this case dealt with a
personal religious practice rather than a decision of a religious community, the Supreme Court’s
disapproval of the courtroom as a forum for the interpretation of religious dogma (Syndicat Northcrest
devolved into a “battle of the experts” between rabbinical authorities) should wisely be applied in the
latter context as well.

Insulated from Justice? Religious Expulsion Before
Canadian Courts in the Post-Highwood Era

17

interpretations and applications of religious doctrine resulting in unfair
expulsions, but it could at least ensure some basic due process for an
impugned individual, and would ultimately be a vast improvement on the
law as it currently exists.
The importance of ensuring that some type of procedural fairness is
afforded in internal decisions of religious expulsion is highlighted by the
concurring reasons of Justice Henry in the Lindenburger decision. Justice
Henry concludes his reasons by underscoring the importance of fairness
and transparency in the quasi-judicial decisions of religious communities:
I cannot leave this case without a final comment on the issue that has
been raised by Mr. Lindenburger, that is the manner in which the case
has been handled. I do not suggest that the church bodies concerned are
required to conduct themselves in a manner similar to that required of a
Court. I say only that in a circumstance such as that revealed in this case
the simplest rule is, to ensure at the end of the day, whatever the final
decision, that it can be said that the minister is told in clear terms the case
he has to meet and be given a fair and full opportunity to meet it. The less
complicated the proceedings the better and one would hope there would
not be undue resort to legalistic thinking; there is no reason why men
of goodwill cannot, on both sides, conduct themselves in a fair manner.
That is all that the law and the spirit of Christianity requires of them.50

While Justice Henry’s argument in favour of the importance of procedural
fairness is persuasive, it rests on a faulty assumption which highlights
the importance of artificially ensuring procedural fairness in this context.
Contrary to Justice Henry’s assertion, there are countless reasons why
generally well-meaning individuals cannot, and do not, conduct themselves
in a fair manner. This has necessitated the creation of law, the courts, and
the appointment of judges such as Justice Henry to impose fairness where
it has been improperly withheld. In the context of religious disputes, which
often touch on issues that are extremely personal, it is not surprising that
the maintenance of fairness may give way to emotional responses and
decisions, which in some instances may result in the devastating expulsion
of members of a religious community. In order to ensure a fair process,
the courts need to be properly empowered with the authority to intervene.
With clear legislative guidance, and judges remaining constantly mindful
of the care that should be exercised when addressing religious disputes,
the Canadian judicial system will be able to ensure that a fair process
has been observed before an individual is expelled from their religious
community.
50.

Lindenburger, supra note 7 at para 16.
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